McClatchy Washington Bureau

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BAGHDAD, Iraq—When radical Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters walked out of the Iraqi government last November to protest Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's meeting in Jordan with President Bush, everyone expected al-Maliki to send an emissary to coax al-Sadr back into the fold.

When al-Sadr dispatched two envoys, however, al-Maliki asked what they wanted. When he was told that they wanted to discuss the budget, he had them thrown out.

"I don't want to see any of them," one of al-Maliki's aides recalled him saying. "Tell them to come back with an apology because they've let down the government at a crucial time."

Al-Sadr's followers agreed to rejoin the government last month, although al-Maliki made none of the concessions the firebrand cleric demanded.

As 21,500 more American troops begin arriving in Iraq in what could be a last U.S. push to secure the capital and the country, al-Maliki will play a crucial role in determining whether his government—and America—succeeds or fails in Iraq. His aides say the push is their government's last chance.

If al-Maliki can rein in Shiite militias, defeat Sunni Muslim insurgents, persuade a recalcitrant parliament to settle divisive issues and muster enough loyal Iraqi troops to quell the violence in Baghdad, the Bush administration's new Iraq strategy might succeed.

If he can't, there may be little more the United States can do to salvage a policy that's taken some 3,100 American lives and tens or hundreds of thousands of Iraqi ones, cost Americans more than $360 billion and alienated much of the world.

There's little obvious evidence that al-Maliki is up to the task. Even his nom de guerre in the Iraqi opposition, Jawad, which he shed when he became prime minister last May 20, is less than intimidating. It means "generous."

Many of his countrymen already have written him off, and the conventional wisdom in the United States is that he's a weak-willed, unsteady politician who depends on the support of the anti-American al-Sadr and the Shiite militias that have infiltrated the country's police and security forces.

Maliki conceded Tuesday that the new security plan for the capital is already behind schedule.

"These operations should unite us when we go to the field soon, even though I feel we are already late. This delay has sent a negative message," he told Iraqi military commanders. "If we just keep talking about the Baghdad security plan for a long time, no one will trust us anymore."

"Maliki is now alone, totally alone, in the corner," said Mithal al Alusi, a secular Sunni legislator who was once a bitter al-Maliki opponent but is now among the prime minister's confidants, though he says the two still dislike each other.

In interviews, however, three close advisers, numerous legislators from al-Maliki's Dawa party and other politicians—both friends and foes—painted a portrait of a defiant leader who's in a position that was designed to be powerless but which has become the cornerstone of his country's hopes for reconciliation.

Many of those interviewed agreed to speak on the record, but others requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. Al-Maliki didn't respond to requests for interviews.

The biggest test of al-Maliki's strength—and his intentions—may be whether he's prepared to battle Shiite extremists as well as Sunni insurgents, especially in neighborhoods such as Baghdad's Sadr City, a stronghold of al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia.

"I will apply the law to everyone ... on militias, political parties, on participants in the political process," he told CNN. "The law rules, and who is on my side in respecting the law and the government's will will be an ally and a partner, and who rebels against the law and the government's will will be a foe."

Sunni leaders—and some U.S. officials—aren't sure he'll be so evenhanded.

Al-Maliki disdains the parts of his government that he thinks are run by Saddamists and terrorists.

During a parliament session in which he mapped out the new Baghdad security plan, he threatened a Sunni cleric and parliament member who said he didn't trust al-Maliki's leadership with arrests in connection with sectarian kidnappings.

Al-Maliki publicly condemns Sunni attacks on Shiite neighborhoods, but he's never openly condemned Shiite militias for attacking Sunnis. Alusi recalled that in their days together on the committee that directed the removal of members of Saddam Hussein's mostly Sunni Baath party from the government, al-Maliki often excused Shiite excesses. Al-Maliki, Alusi said, would say the Shiites were forced to act.

Few think that al-Maliki can afford to go after either al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, although many think it's the prime mover behind Baghdad's sectarian violence, or the Badr Organization, the militia of the Iranian-backed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the main rival of al-Maliki's Dawa party. The Sadrists are the largest bloc in parliament and the reason that al-Maliki is prime minister rather than SCIRI's Adil Abdul-Mehdi.

"If he really goes widely and exclusively against Sadrists without limiting his action or plan to only those who are involved with unlawful doing, then he will definitely lose their (the Sadrists') support," said Adnan Ali al Kadhimi, a longtime Dawa member who served briefly as an adviser to al-Maliki.

"The new security plan is the previous security plan with an aggressive push by the Americans," said Saleh al Mutlaq, a Sunni legislator who now lives in Qatar. "It will be aimed at the Sunnis, not the militias. They will use it against the Sunni areas; they will never target the Sadr areas."

Al-Maliki also must deal with the U.S., whose troops and support he needs, and with Iran, which has considerable political muscle in Iraq. The fact that many Iraqis resent Iran and America, and relations between those countries are bad and getting worse, doesn't make his task any easier.

Those who know al-Maliki say that as a dedicated Arabist he finds it hard to be dependent on the United States. Last October, an aide quoted him as saying that while he's a friend to America, he's not "America's man."

More recently, al-Maliki accused the Americans of undermining his government by constantly criticizing him. He was particularly angered by a comment by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that his government was "on borrowed time" and one by Bush that likened Saddam's execution to a "revenge killing."

As an Arab nationalist, he's long been cool to Persian Iran as well, far cooler than some other Iraqi Shiite leaders.

A member of what was then the opposition Islamic Dawa Party, al-Maliki fled to Iran—the refuge of choice for most Dawa exiles—in 1980 after Saddam's regime sentenced all party members and supporters to death. But Dawa members said he wasn't comfortable there, resented Iranian interference in the Iraqi opposition and soon moved to Syria.

When al-Maliki became prime minister last May, he made Tehran his third destination, first visiting Arab countries, then the United States. Dawa legislators said the sequence was intended to put Iraq squarely in the Arab orbit.

When he got to Tehran, an al-Maliki aide said, he told the Iranians to stay out of Iraq's internal affairs.

The aide also said that al-Maliki showed his feelings about Iran during a recent visit with the German ambassador to Iraq. Al-Maliki asked the ambassador whether Germany had gotten anything out of its relationship with Iran.

"No," the ambassador said, according to the aide.

"Of course not," the aide said al-Maliki responded. "The Iranians will take you to the sea and bring you back thirsty."

However, Iraq's Shiite politics prevents al-Maliki from remaining too distant from the ayatollahs next door, Sunni legislator Mutlaq said.

"Everybody thinks Maliki is running the government by himself, but the government is being run by the coalition," Mutlaq said, referring to the United Iraqi Alliance, a Shiite group composed of al-Maliki's Dawa, SCIRI and al-Sadr's supporters that dominates the parliament. "The whole coalition is connected to Iran. It is hopeless."

Al-Maliki's success may hinge on something he has limited ability to control: Although he's prime minister, his job has little authority.

Al-Maliki didn't pick his own Cabinet ministers, Dawa member Kadhimi said. Instead, the posts were divided up like pieces of a pie; some for the Sunnis, some for the Kurds and the biggest pieces for the Shiites.

Ministries have become tiny empires. The Sadrists, for example, control the health and transportation ministries, which they use to provide social services to improve their image among poor and disenchanted Shiites.

"Does Mr. Maliki have any control over anything? No. Every minister feels that ministry is his own," Kadhimi said.

Few think al-Maliki can depend on the security forces, which Shiite militias have infiltrated thoroughly.

"He is well aware that the Iraqi security forces have no loyalty to the government," said a longtime Dawa member who spoke only on the condition of anonymity because the topic is dangerous.

Al-Maliki also has no power over the parliament, which in any event can rarely muster a quorum to discuss—let alone enact—new laws.

So can he save Iraq from self-destructing?

"I don't know," Sunni legislator Alusi said. "Everything will be decided in the next weeks."

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(c) 2007, McClatchy-Tribune Information Services.

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