Shadows of doubt hang over Iraqi prime minister
By Leila Fadel | McClatchy Newspapers
BAGHDAD, Iraq -
BAGHDAD, Iraq - BAGHDAD, Iraq—As thousands more American and Iraqi troops mount what could be a last U.S. push to secure Iraq and its capital, no one will be more important in determining whether the Iraqi government—and the American effort—succeeds or fails than Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
If al-Maliki can rein in Shiite Muslim militias, defeat Sunni Muslim insurgents, persuade a recalcitrant parliament to settle divisive issues and muster enough loyal Iraqi troops to quell the violence, the Bush administration's new Iraq strategy might succeed.
If he can't, there may be little more the United States can do to salvage a policy that's taken some 3,100 American lives and tens or hundreds of thousands of Iraqi ones, cost Americans more than $360 billion so far and alienated much of the world.
There's little obvious evidence that al-Maliki is up to the task. Even his nom de guerre in the Iraqi opposition, Jawad, which he shed when he became prime minister last May 20, is less than intimidating. It means "generous."
Many of his countrymen already have written him off, and the conventional wisdom in the United States is that he's a weak-willed, unsteady politician who depends on the support of the anti-American Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the country's Shiite militias.
Mahmoud al Mashadani, the Sunni speaker of parliament, called the new Baghdad security plan the government's "last hour," but said he was concerned because Shiite militias had infiltrated the country's police and security forces. "The tools of the plan are corrupted," he said.
Last week, however, Iraqi forces arrested Deputy Health Minister Hakem al Zameli, whose ministry has been controlled by al-Sadr's followers. And in interviews, three close advisers, numerous legislators from al-Maliki's Dawa party and other politicians—both friends and foes—painted a portrait of a defiant leader who's in a position that was designed to be powerless but that's become the cornerstone of his country's hopes for reconciliation.
Many of those interviewed agreed to speak on the record, but others requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. Al-Maliki didn't respond to requests for interviews.
The biggest test of al-Maliki's strength—and his intentions—may be whether he's prepared to battle Shiite extremists as well as Sunni insurgents, especially in neighborhoods such as Baghdad's Sadr City, a stronghold of al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia.
"I will apply the law to everyone ... on militias, political parties, on participants in the political process," he told CNN. "The law rules, and who is on my side in respecting the law and the government's will will be an ally and a partner, and who rebels against the law and the government's will will be a foe."
Sunni leaders—and some U.S. officials—aren't sure he'll be so evenhanded.
Al-Maliki disdains the parts of his government that he thinks are run by Saddamists and terrorists.
During a parliament session in which he mapped out the new Baghdad security plan, he threatened a Sunni cleric and parliament member who said he didn't trust al-Maliki's leadership with arrests in connection with sectarian kidnappings.
Al-Maliki publicly condemns Sunni attacks on Shiite neighborhoods, but he's never openly condemned Shiite militias for attacking Sunnis.
Mithal al Alusi, a secular Sunni legislator who was once a bitter al-Maliki opponent but is now among the prime minister's confidants, recalled that in their days together on the committee that directed the removal of members of Saddam Hussein's mostly Sunni Baath party from the government, al-Maliki often excused Shiite excesses. Al-Maliki, Alusi said, would say the Shiites had been forced to act.
Few think that al-Maliki can afford to go after either al-Sadr's Mahdi Army—although many think it's the prime mover behind Baghdad's sectarian violence—or the Badr Organization, the militia of the Iranian-backed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the main rival of al-Maliki's Dawa party. The Sadrists are the largest bloc in parliament and the reason that al-Maliki is prime minister rather than SCIRI's Adil Abdul-Mehdi.
"If he really goes widely and exclusively against Sadrists without limiting his action or plan to only those who are involved with unlawful doing, then he will definitely lose their (the Sadrists') support," said Adnan Ali al Kadhimi, a longtime Dawa member who served briefly as an adviser to al-Maliki.
"The new security plan is the previous security plan with an aggressive push by the Americans," said Saleh al Mutlaq, a Sunni legislator who now lives in Qatar. "It will be aimed at the Sunnis, not the militias. They will use it against the Sunni areas; they will never target the Sadr areas."
Al-Maliki also must deal with the U.S., whose troops and support he needs, and with Iran, which has considerable political muscle in Iraq. The fact that many Iraqis resent Iran and America, and relations between those countries are bad and getting worse, doesn't make his task any easier.
Those who know al-Maliki say that as a dedicated Arabist he finds it hard to be dependent on the United States. Last October, an aide quoted him as saying that while he's a friend to America, he's not "America's man."
More recently, al-Maliki accused the Americans of undermining his government by constantly criticizing him. He was particularly angered by a comment by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that his government was "on borrowed time" and one by Bush that likened Saddam's execution to a "revenge killing."
As an Arab nationalist, he's long been cool to Persian Iran as well, far cooler than some other Iraqi Shiite leaders.
A member of what was then the opposition Islamic Dawa Party, al-Maliki fled to Iran—the refuge of choice for most Dawa exiles—in 1980 after Saddam's regime sentenced all party members and supporters to death. But Dawa members said he wasn't comfortable there—resenting Iranian interference in the Iraqi opposition—and soon moved to Syria.
When al-Maliki became prime minister last May, he made Tehran his third destination, first visiting Arab countries, then the United States. Dawa legislators said the sequence was intended to put Iraq squarely in the Arab orbit.
When he got to Tehran, an al-Maliki aide said, he told the Iranians to stay out of Iraq's internal affairs.
The aide also said that al-Maliki had showed his feelings about Iran during a recent visit with the German ambassador to Iraq. Al-Maliki asked the ambassador whether Germany had gotten anything out of its relationship with Iran.
"No," the ambassador said, according to the aide.
"Of course not," the aide said al-Maliki responded. "The Iranians will take you to the sea and bring you back thirsty."
However, Iraq's Shiite politics prevents al-Maliki from remaining too distant from the ayatollahs next door, Sunni legislator Mutlaq said.
"Everybody thinks Maliki is running the government by himself, but the government is being run by the coalition," Mutlaq said, referring to the United Iraqi Alliance, a Shiite group composed of al-Maliki's Dawa, SCIRI and al-Sadr's supporters that dominates the parliament. "The whole coalition is connected to Iran. It is hopeless."
Al-Maliki's success may hinge on something he has limited ability to control: Although he's prime minister, his job has little authority.
Al-Maliki didn't pick his own Cabinet ministers, Dawa member Kadhimi said. Instead, the posts were divided up like pieces of a pie; some for the Sunnis, some for the Kurds and the biggest pieces for the Shiites.
Ministries have become tiny empires. The Sadrists, for example, control the health and transportation ministries, which they use to provide social services to improve their image among poor and disenchanted Shiites.
"Does Mr. Maliki have any control over anything? No. Every minister feels that ministry is his own," Kadhimi said.
Few think al-Maliki can depend on the security forces, which Shiite militias have infiltrated thoroughly.
"He is well aware that the Iraqi security forces have no loyalty to the government," said a longtime Dawa member who spoke only on the condition of anonymity because the topic is dangerous.
Al-Maliki also has no power over the parliament, which in any event can rarely muster a quorum to discuss—let alone enact—new laws.
So can he save Iraq from self-destructing?
"I don't know," Alusi said. "Everything will be decided in the next weeks."
———
(c) 2007, McClatchy-Tribune Information Services.
Iraq
McClatchy Newspapers 2007
We welcome comments. Please keep them civil, short and to the point. Obscene, profane, abusive and off topic comments will be deleted. Repeat offenders will be blocked. Thanks for taking part — and abiding by these simple rules.
Comments are displayed newest first. If you would like to read a thread from beginning to end, select "Oldest first" from the drop down menu.
@Nyx.CommentBody@